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Note: Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities
Noninstitutional investors have doubled the value of their
municipal securities' holdings in the past 15 years. 2 In 1974
alone, additional "household" investments accounted for nearly
70 percent of the total increase in the value of outstanding
municipal securities. 3 Rising personal income has enhanced the
attractiveness of higher yield, tax-free municipal securities to
individuals, 4 while "tight" money has decreased the funds available to institutional buyers.5 To enhance the marketability of
their bonds, municipalities have reduced bond face value from
the traditional $5000 to amounts as low as $5006 and have used
advertisements specifically designed to attract unsophisticated
investors.7 While noninstitutional investment in municipal securities has grown, the safety of that investment has deteriorated. Federal loan guarantees8 were necessary to prevent New
York City, with $7.35 billion in bonds outstanding,9 from defaulting on its obligations. 10 Similar, though less dramatic, financial
1. Throughout this Note the term "municipal securities" refers to

long-term obligations of states, their political subdivisions, and agencies
or instrumentalities of states or their political subdivisions.
2. S.REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as S. REP. No. 75].
3. Id. "Households" include individual investors, personal trusts,
and unincorporated businesses.
4. Id. at 42.
5. Doty, Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws to Exempt Offerings: Duties of Underwriters and Counsel,
16 B.C. Ixn. & Com. L. REV. 393, 399 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Doty].
6. Wall St. J., June 12, 1975, at 22, col. 2 (Eastern ed.).
7. The following ad for New York City's Municipal Assistance Corporation was reported in NEwswEEK, Sept. 22, 1975, at 27:
At over 10% TAX-FREE how come none of your savings are
in "BIG M.A.C." Bonds? You don't have to be a Park Avenue
millionaire to get in on BIG M.A.C. bonds. They're printed in
$1000 pieces. They pay twice as much as some banks. And
they're free of federal, state and city income taxes. Send for
our free information kit and start earning the highest tax-free
interest rate in American history.
8. New York City Seasonal Financing Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94143, 1976 US. CoDE CoxG. & ADm. NEws 797.
9. McFadden, Individual Bondholders Are Disillusioned, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 48, col. 2.
10. Redemption of $1.6 billion of New York City notes, however,
has been delayed for at least three years. New York State Emergency
Moratorium Act for the City of New York, ch. 874, as amended
ch. 875 (McKinney Spec. Pamphlet Jan. 1976). The constitutionality of this legislation was upheld in a class action suit instituted by
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difficulties plague other cities."' And some states may be
unable to make principal and interest payments on "moral obligation bonds"' 2 issued by state agencies; 13 even certain general
obligation bonds, 14 once considered nearly as safe as United
States
government bonds, have lost much of their respectabil5
ity.'

The entry of less sophisticated investors into the municipal
securities market and the increasing risk accompanying municipal securities call into question the failure of the securities laws
to require issuers of municipal securities to disclose financial information to investors. This Note will briefly examine the existing structure of federal municipal securities regulation and discuss its inadequacies. The Note will propose that Congress, while
allowing for the unique problems of municipal issuers, modify
the structure by enacting a registration requirement for municipal issues that will promote full disdosure to investors.
I. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL REGULATION
A.

BACKGROUND

The Securities Act of 19331 6 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 193417 are the bases of federal securities regulation.' Before securities are distributed to the public, the 1933 Act generally requires complete and accurate disclosure of the identity of
and remuneration to the directors, principal officers, and underwriters of the issuer; the identity and holdings of major stockholders; the recent financial statements and material contracts
of the issuer; the proposed use of the funds to be acquired
through the issue; underwriting agreements; and other informathe Flushing National Bank. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 39 Clark's Digest-Annot. 35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1975).
11. Jensen, Crisis Is Believed to Cost Other Borrowers Billions, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6, at 48, col. 7 (Detroit, Newark, and
Boston).
12. See text accompanying note 107 infra.
13. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 13, 1975, at 80-82.
14. See text accompanying notes 102-03 infra.
15. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 13, 1975, at 84. Not all issues have lost their
attractiveness. Pennsylvania recently sold $100 million of general obligation bonds bearing an interest rate of 6.24 percent. 68 MooDy's BoND
SuWVEY 1765 (1976).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as Securities

Act].
17. Id. §§ 78a-78hh [hereinafter cited as Securities Exchange
Act].
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tion relating to the issuer.'
This disclosure is to be made in
a registration statement that must be filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and in a prospectus that must
be furnished to securities purchasers. 19 The Act prohibits
fraudulent and deceptive practices in offering or selling securities and subjects those who violate these prohibitions or who fail
to comply with its disclosure requirements to civil and criminal
20
liabilities.
The 1934 Act requires securities exchanges and over-thecounter brokers and dealers to register with the SEC and
regulates business practices in the securities industry.21 It
22
sets standards for securities trading by corporate "insiders"
and for proxy solicitations, 23 and requires certain companies to
register and file periodic reports with the SEC. 24 The Act also
prohibits fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative practices in
securities transactions and provides penalties for violators. 25
Municipal securities, for "obvious political reasons," 26 were
18. Securities Act §§ 7, 10, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j,
77aa (1970).

19. Section 5 (a) prohibits the use of the mails or any means or in-

strumentality of interstate commerce for the sale or delivery of securities
unless a registration statement is in effect. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970).
Section 5(b) requires that a prospectus accompany or precede delivery
of sales literature as well as the security itself. Id. § 77e (b).
20. Section 17 (a) prohibits fraudulent interstate transactions. Id. §

77q(a), quoted in note 56 infra. Civil liabilities are set forth in
sections 11, 12, and 15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (1970); see notes 9192 infra and accompanying text. Section 24 prescribes criminal penalties
for willful violations. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970); see notes 71-73 infra and
accompanying text.
21. Section 5 prohibits the use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to affect or report securities transactions on unregistered exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970). Section 15 requires registration of brokers and dealers. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (Supp.
1976), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
22. Securities Exchange Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
23. Id. § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
24. Id. § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
25. E.g., id. §§ 9, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1970). Criminal penalties
for willful violations are prescribed in section 32. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff
(1970); see text accompanying note 74 infra. Civil penalties for willful
violations are prescribed in section 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
26. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,
28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 29, 39 (1959). Although Landis does not identify
specific political pressures, it is reasonable to speculate that members of
Congress might have been reluctant to impose stringent federal regulation on one of the means by which state and local governments financed
their operations-especially since not a few senators and representatives
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originally exempted from all but the general antifraud provision
of the 1933 Act. 27

One witness at committee hearings on the

Senate version of the 1933 Act strongly criticized the exemption,
arguing unsuccessfully that municipal securities investors needed
more information than was usually available. 28 The Port of
New York Authority, meanwhile, secured an expansion of the
exemption to include any "instrumentality of any State or
States" 29 without even appearing before the committee. 30 In
considering the 1934 Act, Congress was persuaded by extensive
testimony that full application of the Act to municipal securities
markets would unduly burden the securities industry and impair
the fund-raising abilities of municipal issuers, so it once again
granted an exemption. 31
owed their election to the same political "machines" that dominated
these levels of government.
27. Securities Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970), provides that:
(a) Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions
of this subchapter shall not apply to any of the following classes
of securities:
(2) Any security issued or guaranteed ... by any State of the
United States, or by any political subdivision of a State or territory, or by any public instrumentality of one or more States or
territories ....
28. Hearings on S.875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGisIAnvs HisTORY OF THE SECURTIsS ACT OF 1933 AND SEcUtrrms ExcHANGE ACT OF 1934,
Item 21 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar ed. 1.973) (testimony of A.H. Carter,
President, New York Society of Certified Public Accountants) [hereinafter cited as Ellenberger & Mahar].
29. Securities Act § 3 (a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c (a) (2) (1970).
30. Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50 (1933), reprinted in Ellenberger

& Mahar, supra note 28, Item 21 (letter oE the Port of New York Author-

ity). The Authority noted in a letter to the chairman of the Senate Committee that since it was an instrumentality of both New York and New
Jersey, it was technically not covered by the exemption of "any State
...or political subdivision or agency thereof." The language suggested
by the Authority was incorporated into S. 875 and eventually into the

Securities Act of 1933.
31. Securities Exchange Act § 3(a), ch. 404, § 3(a), 48 Stat. 882
(1934), as amended 15 U.S.C.A. 78c (Supp. 1976), provided that
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires(12) The term "exempted security" or "exempted securities" in-

cludes . . .securities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by a State or any
political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumental-

ity of a State or any political subdivision thereof, or by any
municipal corporate instrumentality of one or more States ....
See Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.

MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
Subsequent developments in the municipal securities markets, however, caused Congress to reconsider the exemption for
municipal securities under the 1934 Act. Tax-free municipal
bonds became increasingly attractive to the individual investor
as his personal income rose, and certain municipal securities
firms were able to prey on that investor's lack of sophistication.
High pressure sales of low quality bonds by inadequately trained
and supervised personnel characterized these "boiler room"
operations. Salesmen whose jobs depended on high sales production attempted to induce hasty, ill-considered investment decisions.3 2 They falsely told investors that bond supplies were
limited or that sellers in particular transactions needed tax losses
and were therefore anxious to dispose of their holdings. They
misrepresented highly speculative revenue bonds as general obligations bonds, falsely claiming that principal and interest on
some bonds were guaranteed. They recommended municipal
bonds as good investments without knowing the financial condition and investment needs of their customers.3 3 Firms sold bonds
from their own accounts at inflated prices and delivered "fractionals" as substitutes for bonds ordered by customers. 34 They
sent sales confirmations to people who had refused to order
bonds over the telephone, 35 and, in some instances, they took
3 6
payment for bonds that had never been purchased.
7037-46, 7441-55 (1934), reprinted in 6-7 Ellenberger & Mahar, supra note
28, Item 22; Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 415, 449,
817-25 (1934), reprinted in 8-9 Ellenberger & Mahar, supra note 28, Item
23.
32. S. REP. No. 75, supra note 2, at 43.
33. The wide range of fraudulent activities engaged in by some
municipal securities dealers is illustrated in the following successful SEC
injunctive actions: SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 866,
871-77 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assoc., 386 F.
Supp. 1327, 1331-35 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); SEC v. Investors Assoc. of
America, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [ 93,644, at
92,896 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (complaint summary).
34. SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 874 (S.D.
Fla. 1974); SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 1327,

1333 (W.D. Tenn. 1973). These bonds, bearing a stated interest rate of
a fraction of one percent, would normally be sold at large discounts so
that the buyer's only significant return-the difference between face
amount and purchase price-would be realized at redemption.
35. See SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 873 (S.D.
Fla. 1974); SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assoc., No. C-72-368 (W.D.
Tenn. Feb. 4, 1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,431, at 95,480 (consent decree summary).
36. See SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 874 (S.D.
Fla. 1974).
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Because these firms were exempt from regulation under the
Exchange Act8 7 the SEC could not adequately supervise their

business practices. Control over municipal securities professionals was limited to post hoc enforcement of the antifraud
provisions of the securities acts.38 If the Commission discovered
a "boiler room" operation, it could do no more than seek an
injunction to prevent further violations.8 9 This case-by-case
approach, however, was ineffective in deterring other firms from
conducting similar operations. 40 Although only a small portion
of municipal securities firms engaged in such practices, they
presented great dangers to individual investors and the municipal
securities industry as a whole. 41 Recognizing the interests of
both investors and governmental issuers in sound municipal securities markets, Congress amended the Exchange Act in 1975
to prevent the continuation of fraudulent practices in the indus42

try.

B. THE SEcuRITIEs ACTS AmENDNIE. TS OF 1975
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 expand federal
regulation of the securities industry by subjecting municipal
securities brokers and dealers to the registration requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act and by establishing an independent body authorized to set qualifications and standards of conduct
for municipal securities professionals.
1.

Registration

Congress has vested the SEC with broad powers over
municipal securities brokers and dealers by requiring them to
register with the Commission. 43 Unregistered brokers and deal37. Securities Exchange Act § 3(a) (12), ch. 404, § 3(a) (12), 48 Stat.
882 (1934), as amended 15 U.S.C.A. 78c (Supp. 1976), quoted in note 31
supra.
38. S. REP. No. 75, supra note 2, at 42.
39. See SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 1327,
1336 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (if defendants decided to reenter the securities
business, "the public would have the protection of the injunctive decree").
40. S. REP. No. 75, supranote 2, at 43.
41. Id. at 38.
42. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 § 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o
(Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Amendments]. Also amended
were portions of the Securities Exchange Act not directly related to
municipal securities, Securities Act of 1933, Investment Company Act
of 1940, Investment Advisors Act of 1940, and others. Id. §§ 25-30,
89 Stat. 163-70 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A.).
43. Id. § 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (Sup:p. 1976).
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ers may not conduct interstate operations,4 4 and the SEC may
deny registration to unqualified applicants on the basis of their
45
prior conduct or failure to meet qualification standards.
Registrants must comply with record-keeping and reporting
requirements prescribed by the Commission; 46 the SEC will
inspect their operations within six months after registration to
assess their conformance with the Act and the SEC's rules and
regulations. 47 The Commission, by administrative order, can
limit the activities, functions, or operations of any registered
broker or dealer who violates the securities laws or fails reasonably to supervise persons who commit violations while subject
to his supervision; it may also suspend his registration for up
48
to 12 months or revoke it altogether.
2.

Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board

By the creation of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board (MSRB), the 1975 Amendments serve to maintain the selfregulatory structure of the securities industry. 49 The MSRB
is authorized to establish standards of training, experience, competence, and other qualifications for municipal securities professionals and to require these professionals to pass appropriate
qualification exams. 50 The Board is to prescribe the records municipal securities businesses must keep 51 and to require periodic
examinations of these firms to determine their compliance with
the securities laws. 2 The Amendments, in enumerating the objectives underlying the general rulemaking authority of the
MSRB, require that the rules promulgated by the Board
be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to
44.

Id.

45. Id., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1976).
46. Securities Exchange Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1970).
47. 1975 Amendments § 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (b) (2) (C) (Supp.
1976).
48. Id., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b) (4) (Supp. 1976).
49. Id. § 13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b) (1) (Supp. 1976).
50. Id., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b) (2) (A) (Supp. 1976). The MSRB
has proposed rules providing for exams and apprenticeships for new
municipal securities professionals, setting personnel and bonding standards for municipal securities businesses, requiring municipal securities businesses to comply with restrictions imposed by regulatory agencies, and prohibiting certain individuals and firms from engaging in
municipal securities business.

BNA SEC. REa.

& L. REP., Jan. 7, 1976,

at A-8.
51. 1975 Amendments § 13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b) (2) (G) (Supp.
1976).
52. Id., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b) (2) (E) (Supp. 1976).
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foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in
regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect
to, and facilitating transactions in municipal securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market in municipal securities,
and, in general, to protect
53
investors and the public interest.
The sole function of the MSRB is to promulgate rules; the
Amendments delegate inspection, examination, and disciplinary
54
responsibilities to existing regulatory bodies.

C. ENSURING

DISCLOSURE TO MUNICIPAL SECURITIES INVESTORS

The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 did nothing to
significantly alter the Securities Act of 1933; thus, municipal
securities issuers remain exempt from the registration and
prospectus requirements of that Act.55 Brokers, dealers, and
municipal issuers are subject to a limited disclosure obligation,
53. Id., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b) (2) (C) (Supp. 1976).
54. These bodies include the SEC, federal banking agencies, and the
National Association of Securities Dealers.
55. Securities Act § 3(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (1970), quoted in
note 27 supra. The registration requirement for nonexempt securities is
found in section 5:
(a) Unless a registration statemen; is in effect as to a security,
it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails
to sell such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in
interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery
after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails
to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any security with
respect to which a registration statement has been filed under
this subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the requirements
of section 77j of this title; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in
interstate commerce any such security for the purpose of sale
or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by
a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of
section 77j of this title.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer
to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has
been filed as to such security, or while the registration statement
is the subject of a refusal order or stop order to (prior to the
effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under section 77h of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
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however, since the municipal securities exemption does not
extend to the general antifraud provisions of the securities
acts."0 Section 17(a) 57 of the Securities Act and rule 1Ob-5,5 8
promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, both prohibit persons engaged in the distribution and sale of securities
from making any untrue statement of a material fact and from
omitting any material fact "necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading." These prohibitions may be enforced
through SEC administrative procedures, injunctive and criminal
56. Section 17 of the Securities Act provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of
any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of
the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
the purchaser.
(c) The exemptions provided in section
77c of this title shall
not apply to the provisions of this section.
15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. § 78j.
57. Id. § 77q(a).
58. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of a national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
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proceedings initiated by the SEC, and actions for disgorgement
initiated by the Commission or injured investors.
1. AdministrativeActions
A registered securities professional who fails to provide
adequate information to municipal securities investors may
thereby violate section 17(a) of the Securities Act, rule 10b-5,
and the rules under section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act regulating broker and dealer conduct. 59 A Commission finding
that such violations were willful exposes the professional to
administrative sanctions ranging from censure to revocation of
his registration with the SEC.6 0 Moreover, the professional may
not avoid the sanctions by relying on information provided to
him by others involved in the distribution of the securities:
It is incumbent on firms participating in an offering and on
dealers recommending municipal bonds to their customers as
"good municipal bonds" to make diligent inquiry, investigation
and disclosure as to material facts relating to the issuer of the
securities and bearing upon the ability of the issuer to service
such bonds. It is, moreover, essential that dealers offering such
bonds to the public make certain that the offering circulars and
other selling literature are based upon an adequate investigation
so that they accurately reflect all material facts which a prudent
investor should know in order to evaluate the offering before
reaching an investment decision. 6 1

The SEC may also censure attorneys and experts, such as
accountants and engineers, under whose authority material facts
are misrepresented or omitted in sales literature. It may suspend
or prohibit them from appearing or practicing before the Commission. 62 These sanctions are comparable to suspension or
revocation of a broker's registration..6 3 They preclude preparing

registration statements, prospectuses, and other documents filed
with the Commission as well as transacting business directly with
59. 1975 Amendments § 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 770 (c) (Supp. 1976).
60. Id., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (b) (4) (D) (Supp. 1976).
61. In re Walston & Co. and Harrington, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8165 (Sept. 22, 1967), in [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH FEm. SEC. L. REP. 77,474, at 82,944-45 (1967); see Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) (underwriter who relied
on false financial statements prepared by certified public accountants
held liable for failing to investigate further).
62. SEC Rules of Practice 2(e), :17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1) (1975).
While SEC censure may have no immediate legal effects, it may be taken
into account if future violations are committed. See text accompanying
note 72 infra.
63. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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the SEC. 64 Moreover, municipal bond counsel who assume legal
responsibility for reviewing municipal offering circulars may
have greater obligations to investors than do other experts. The
Commission has concluded that, in such situations, counsel have
a duty to investigate the completeness and accuracy of statements made not only by themselves, but by others as well, at
least if there is reason to suspect that material facts have been
onitted. 65
2.

Injunctions

The Commission may seek injunctive relief to enforce the
disclosure obligations of issuers as well as of those persons subject to SEC administrative sanctions.66 An injunction against
further violations of the securities laws subjects a defendant to
criminal contempt prosecution if he commits subsequent violations6( and exposes those under direct SEC supervision to
immediate disciplinary action by the Commission. Thus, the
SEC may sanction a registered broker or dealer enjoined from
engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection
with his business just as it may one it finds to have violated
a securities law.6 s An attorney or expert under injunction may
be censured or suspended or disqualified from practicing before
the Commission unless he can show that such penalties should
not be imposed.6 9 Furthermore, an injunction may adversely affect the ability of a businessman to carry on normal business
operations." °
64. SEC Rules of Practice 2(g), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1975).
65. In re Furguson, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5523
(Aug. 21, 1975), in 5 SEC Docx. 37-38 (1974).
66. Securities Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1970); 1975 Amendments § 17, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d) (Supp. 1976).
67. Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities
Laws and Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 901, 946 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Mathews]; see Frank v. United States, 384 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1967),
aff'd, 395 U.S. 147 (1969) (defendant placed on three years' probation for
criminal contempt of injunction prohibiting further violations of sections
5 and 17 (a) of the 1933 Act).
68. 1975 Amendments § 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b) (4) (C) (Supp.
1976).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (3) (1975). See also SEC v. Ezrine, [19721973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 93,579 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(summary of SEC complaint, in action to enjoin attorney suspended from
practice before the SEC from continuing his securities practice).
70. See, e.g., SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1380 (D.
Colo. 1970). The defendant contended unsuccessfully that a permanent
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CriminalProceedings

Persons who willfully breach their disclosure duties may be
subjected to criminal prosecution. The SEC may transmit evidence of such violations "to the Attorney General who may, in
' 71
his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings.
In determining whether to recommend criminal action, the
Commission normally considers such factors as previous securities laws violations and whether the current violation was particularly flagrant. 72 Convicted section 17(a) violators may be
imprisoned for up to five years and fined up to $10,000."
Rule 10b-5 violations are similarly punishable, unless the violator
proves he had no knowledge of the rule, in which case he may
74
not be imprisoned.
4. Disgorgement
Neither section 17(a) nor rule 10b-5 expressly allows
investors to recover losses caused by inadequate disclosure, but
the SEC and investors have several ways of securing a return
of funds. First, the SEC can encourage defendants in administrative proceedings to reimburse investors by considering such
action as mitigating the violations.75 Second, the Commission,
when seeking injunctive relief, can request the court to order
disgorgement as an additional equitable remedy. 76 Finally,
investors may initiate suits based on an implied right of action
injunction should be vacated because (1) it probably caused a bank to
deny him loans; (2) it prevented him from becoming a member of a
board of directors since it hampered his ability to authorize the issuance
of stock; and (3) it prevented him from raising capital needed for his
business since the SEC refused to grant a waiver that would allow him
to make a "Regulation A" offering.
71. Securities Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); 1975 Amendments § 17, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d) (Supp. :[976).
72. Mathews, supra note 67, at 916.
73. 1975 Amendments § 27(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (Supp. 1976).
74. Id. § 27(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (Supp. 1976).
75. In re Walston & Co. and Harrington, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8165 (Sept. 22, 1967), in [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 77,474, at 82,913 (1967) (registrant offered to
repurchase bonds at prices paid plus interest and to return any contributions to the bondholder's committee).
76. See SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D.
Fla. 1974); Treadway, SEC Enforcement Techniques: 881 Expanding and
Exotic Forms of Ancillary Relief, 32 WASH. & LrE L. REV. 637 (1975);

Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1188, 1194-96 (1975).
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under section 17(a) or rule 10b-5. 77 This right, at least in its
application to rule 10b-5 violations, extends to mfnicipal securities investors even though they are excluded from the express
cause of action afforded to investors by the 1933 Act.7 8

Success-

ful plaintiffs may rescind their purchases, ' 9 or they may recover
the difference between the purchase price and either the actual
value of the securities at the time of purchase 80 or the value at
the time the fraud was, or reasonably should have been, discovered.8 '
II. INADEQUACY OF PRESENT REGULATION
Regulation of municipal securities professionals under the
Exchange Act should reduce the incidence of fraudulent practices
in the municipal securities industry. And when violations do
occur, remedial administrative actions, while possibly neither
swifter nor more economical than the court proceedings previously required, can be taken by the agencies charged with enforcing the securities laws. 2 Nevertheless, this expansion of municipal securities regulation offers less protection to municipal securities investors than to corporate securities investors. Disclosures
made in corporate securities offerings must conform to the spe77. The Supreme Court recognized the existence of an implied pri-

vate right of action under rule lOb-5 in Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The Court has not yet ruled
on the existence of an implied right of action under section 17 (a) of the
1933 Act. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
734 n. 6 (1975). Judge Friendly, however, has stated that "[o]nce it had
been established.., that an aggrieved buyer has a private action under
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act, there seemed little practical point in denying

the existence of such an action under § 17-with the important proviso
that fraud, as distinct from mere negligence, must be alleged." SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (concurring

opinion). Contra, Russell v. Travel Concepts Corp., No. 74-198 NA-CV
(M.D. Tenn. 1975), CCH FEm. SEc. L. RF. %95,230, at 98,218 (1975) (no
private action exists under section 17(a) since the 1933 Act contains express civil remedies under section 12 (2)).

78. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F.

Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky, 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Thiele v.
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
79. Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
80. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
81. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1968).
82. See Auerbach, Should Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudicatory Functions?, 1959 Wis. L. Rv. 95, 108-12.
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cifications of the 1933 Act,83 and the SEC can delay or suspend
public distribution of the securities if the disclosures appear incomplete or inaccurate.8 4 Municipal securities investors, on the
other hand, must rely on the threat of administrative actions,
injunctions, criminal prosecution, and disgorgement to motivate
full disclosure in municipal securities offerings. Moreover, these
remedies may not always be available. In any event, they cannot
ensure that investors will have the information they need to formulate rational investment decisions.

A. ADMInISTRATIVE ACTION, INJUNCTIONS, AND CRnMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The SEC can discipline a municipal securities professional
who breaches his duty to investigate an issuer and the statements made in sales literature only after a default has demonstrated the inadequacy of the investigation.8 5 Even then, the
Commission must find that the failure to conduct a sufficient
inquiry constitutes a "willful" violation of the securities laws.8 6
Administrative proceedings sanctioning an expert also must follow discovery of defective disclosures and therefore cannot logically be used to compel more complete disclosure before distribution. Since municipal securities offerings do not normally involve appearance or practice before the Commission,8 7 an expert
who confines his business to this field will be immune from SEC
disciplinary actions. The Commission may seek injunctive relief,8 8 but even if it establishes a securities law violation, the
court may refuse to issue an injunction unless the Comdssion
can also demonstrate that the violator is likely to commit further
violations. 8 9 The possibility of criminal prosecution may deter
83. Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970).
84. Id. § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970).
85. See, e.g., In re Walston & Co. and Harrington, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8165 (Sept. 22, 1967), in [1966-1967 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,474, at 82,945 (1967).
86. 1975 Amendments § 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (b) (4) (D) (Supp.
1976).
Doty concludes that the Commission's determination that failure of
an underwriter to investigate constitutes a "willful" violation, see case
cited in note 85 supra, means that the "extent of the obligation [to investigate] is probably set at a negligence level-at least in commission
disciplinary and enforcement actions." Doty, supranote 5, at 416.
87. Doty, supranote 5, at 441.
88. See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra.
89. See SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F.
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).

Supp.
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some persons from flagrantly violating the securities laws, but
will not, in itself, foster proper disclosures. 90
B. DISGORGEMENT
Municipal securities investors not only must tolerate less
disclosure than corporate securities investors, but they may also
experience greater difficulty in recovering losses caused by inadequate disclosure. The 1933 Act expressly imposes civil liabilities
on those who participate in the distribution of nonexempt
securities where material misrepresentations or omissions are
made in the registration statement or prospectus. 91 The defendants bear the burden of proving that, after reasonable investigation, they did not know of the defect and could not reasonably
have discovered it.92 On the other hand, exempt securities
investors, relying on an implied right of action,9 3 must, in
addition to proving that disclosure was materially defective,
prove that the defendant was negligent and that their loss was
the proximate result of that negligence. 94 Those courts that
generally require a showing of some form of scienter in implied
actions under the securities laws, rather than mere negligence,
place an additional obstacle in the path of the investor in exempt
securities. 95
C.

LACK OF PREVENTIVE MEASURES

The 1933 and 1934 Acts embody a single comprehensive
scheme for the protection of securities investors. They include
measures to prevent the use of unfair practices in the distribution and trading of securities and to provide compensation to
investors who suffer losses because of such practices.90 The preventive provisions of the 1933 Act, however, are not applicable
to municipal securities. Unlike corporate securities registration
statements and prospectuses, municipal securities sales litera-

90. Cf. J. HALL, GENERAL PixcimLEs OF CsmuVmAL LAw 137-41 (2d
ed. 1968).
91. Securities Act §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-77l (1970).
92. This burden, known as the "due diligence defense" is set out
in sections 11(b) (3) and 12(2) of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k
(b) (3), 771(2) (1970).
93. See notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
94. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
95. See Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (1Oth Cir. 1974); Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
96. See notes 16-25 supra and accompanying text.
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ture is not subject to predistribution review, 9 7 and there is no
established disclosure standard comparable to that for corporate
issues.9 8 Moreover, the 1975 Amendments expressly prohibit the
MSRB from requiring municipal issuers to furnish any information to investors.9 9 The remedial actions available to the SEC
and investors cannot be used prospectively to compel full disclosure, but must be employed on a case-by-case basis as defective
disclosures in particular securities offerings are discovered.
Disclosures made in these post hoc proceedings can be of no value
as bases for investment decisions. Thus investors in municipal
securities are not assured that issuers will furnish information
sufficient to allow an accurate appraisal of the risks involved
in the purchase of their securities.
III. REGISTRATION OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
While the exemption of municipal securities from the
registration requirement of the 1933 Act may have been politically motivated, 10 0 several rationales have been advanced to
support it. First, the inherent safety of municipal securities investments provides adequate investor protection, and, therefore,
elaborate disclosure is unnecessary. Second, the typical municipal securities investor is sophisticated and thus capable of protecting his own interests. Third, registration would increase the
cost of issuing municipal securities, thereby limiting the ability
of local governments to raise needed capital. Fourth, registration would involve increased federal interference in local
government. In view of recent developments in the municipal
securities field, however, these rationales have lost much of their
vitality. Moreover, there are fundamental benefits in registration that outweigh any detrimental effects. Registration would
protect investors through full disclosure, restore investor confidence in municipal securities, encourage more responsive government, and better allocate capital resources.
A. RATIONALEs FOR ExEvwTION
1. Safety of MunicipalSecurities Investments
Historically, municipal securities have been considered nearly
97. 1975 Amendments § 13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(d) (1) (Supp. 1976).
98. Securities Act Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970).
99. 1975 Amendments § 13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (d) (2) (Supp. 1976).
100. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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as safe as United States government bonds. 10 1 While municipal
general obligation bonds are normally supported by taxes levied
10 2
on the real property within the boundaries of a municipality,
bondholders have first claim to all revenues of the issuer and
are therefore protected to the full extent of the issuer's taxing
powers. 103 This protection, however, does not extend to holders
of revenue or moral obligation bonds. Revenue bonds are serviced by the income from the project funded by the bond
issue. 10 4 If a project fails to produce revenues sufficient to
cover bond payments, investors have no claim to other funds of
the issuer 0 5 Moral obligation bonds are normally issued by
state agencies and serviced by agency revenues. 0 6 The state
has no legal obligation to make back payments; it merely assumes
a "moral obligation" to appropriate funds if agency revenues are
insufficient. 0 7 Moreover, the right of general obligation bondholders to first claim to tax revenues of the issuer may be
illusory. For example, the New York legislature subordinated
New York City bondholders' claims to those of the Municipal
Assistance Corporation. 0 8 Furthermore, one of the city administration's first responses to a near default on October 17,
1975 was to secure a writ permitting it to use city revenues to
meet city payrolls before servicing bonds.' 0 9 Further, the
ability of municipal issuers to service debt by raising taxes is
limited by the level of tax rates tolerated by the electorate." 0
This limitation is compounded by the development of overlapping
101.

Speer, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Municipal
B.J. 146, 151 (1955).
102. L. CnsmABx, THE LAW or REVmmE BONDS 59 (1954) [hereinafter

Bonds, 44 ILL.

cited as CHERmAK].
103. Id.

104. G. HEMPEL, THE POSTWAR QUALrrY OF STATE ANDILOCAL DEBT 93-

97 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HEMPEL].
105. Id.

106. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., ANALYTICAL FACTORS IN MuNICIPAL BOND RATINGs
MOODY'S].

6-7 (undated pamphlet) [hereinafter cited as

107. Id.
108. N.Y. STATE FINANCE LAW § 92-d (McKinney Supp. 1975). The
constitutionality of this legislation, which diverted city use and sales tax
revenues to MAC and its bondholders to the extent necessary to support
MAC bonds, was upheld in a class action instituted by the Flushing National Bank. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. City of New York, 39 Clark's Digest-Annot. 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1975).
109. Jensen, CrisisIs Believed to Cost Other Borrowers Billions, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6, at 48, col. 5.
110. R. ROBINSON, POSTWAR MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SrcunR=s 39 (1960) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON].
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independent taxing districts that provide services beyond the
financial ability of local governmental units."' Thus, while the
taxes imposed by one municipal entity may be reasonable when
compared to the value of taxable property, the aggregate burden
of all overlapping districts may be excessive. 112 Municipal
governments experiencing financial difficulties are simply more
likely to default on their obligations than place intolerable
burdens on their citizens." 83
Type of Investors
Investors in municipal securities historically have been
considered capable of protecting their own interests. In past
years, the purchasers of municipal securities "tended to be
sophisticated and small in number, and frequently [were] institutions or individuals from the same 'locality' as the issuing
governmental body." 114 "Today, [however,] a new class of investors, primarily consisting of individuals who are unsophisticated in securities matters has developed for municipal securi2.

ties .... I'll

For example, nearly two-thirds of the value of

New York City's outstanding bonds is held by individuals or
families; the typical investor, with an average holding of approximately $35,000, files a joint tax return declaring annual income
of $25,000.116 These investors have neither the sophistication nor
the concentrated economic power of large institutional investors
7
to ensure that issuers will fully disclose pertinent information."1
Of course, investors in most municipal issues have sources
of information other than the issuer. Bond-rating services evaluate the creditworthiness of the bonds of most municipal issuers.118 They gather and analyze information concerning
CHERMAK, supra note 102, at 74.
112. For example, Cook County, Illinois has been burdened by as
many as 392 governmental taxing units at the same time. Id. at 87.
113. RoBiNsoN, supra note 110, at 60.
114. Doty, supra note 5, at 396.
115. Hearings on H.R. 4570 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 42 (1975) (testimony of J. Evans, Commissioner, SEC), reportedin BNA SEC. REG. &L. REP., Apr. 23, 1975, at A-6.
116. McFadden, Individual Bondholders Are Disillusioned, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 48, cols. 2-3 (testimony of James A. Lebenthai, Executive Vice President, Lebenthal, Inc., before the Senate Banking Committee).
117. Doty, supra note 5, at 399.
118. Moody's also has rated the short-.term notes of 141 governmental
units on a scale from MIG1 (the best) to MIG4. 68 MooDY's BoNi SuRvEY 1739 (1976).
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the issuer and any project to be funded by the issue. The analyst
employs no established formula 1 9 but rather considers such
factors as the amount of debt service charges, the revenues and
expenditures expected during the life of the debt, any indications
of the issuer's financial prudence and willingness to pay its debts,
the capability of its administration, and probable future economic
trends.1 20 While these ratings are heavily relied on by investors, they are not an adequate substitute for full disclosure. The
informal nature of the rating process makes it impossible to
determine the precise basis of the rating.121 Different analysts
may disagree as to the relative importance of various factors,'1 22

thus

making

comparisons

of

issuers

inaccurate.

2

Furthermore, the information on which the rating is based is
furnished by the issuer and might not be independently verified
by the rating service. 24 Even though the rating is generally
an accurate analysis of the credit standing of the issuer, 25 heavy
investor reliance on ratings by one or two services will magnify
the effects of errors in judgment. A greater number of independent analyses, made possible by wider distribution of information, would lessen the effect of individual judgment errors.
119. The question is how debt, financial, governmental and economic analyses are put together to determine a rating. Simply,
it is a question of examining each area of information and their
interrelations and making a judgment modified as necessary by
evidence and experience. There is no way to cram them all into
a single formula which invariably produces the right answer.
The stumbling block is weighting.
MooDY's,

supra note 106, at 7.

120. Id. at 2-6.
121. These ratings have been described as follows:
[T]he ratings themselves resemble in a sense the ratings which
you see in some of the better gastronomic guidebooks. Instead
of stars they assign letters. Moody's assigns a triple A for the
best credit, a double A for the second best, a single A for the
third best, and so on down the scale, which is basically divided
into eight gradations, and the Standard & Poor's system resembles this.
Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm. Subcomm. on Economic Progress, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967) (testimony of R. Goodman, Director
of Finance, New York City) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings].
122. MooDy's, supra note 106, at 7.
123. HEPEL, supra note 104, at 106 n.5.
124. 1967 Hearings,supra note 121, at 60 (testimony of J.C. Hurlbert,
Mayor of Aberdeen, S.D.). See also id. at 16 (testimony of R. Goodman,
Director of Finance, New York City).
125. Cf. HEMPEL, supra note 104, at 106-09. Hempel notes that the
accuracy of the ratings has not been tested by a major period of defaults
since the depression when 78 percent of defaulting issuers were rated
Aaa or Aa by Moody's. Id. at 109.
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Cost of Registration

The major objection of municipal issuers to disclosure under
the securities laws has been the increased expense certain to
result from these requirements. It has been estimated, for
example, that the average cost of issuing corporate debt securities, excluding compensation of underwriters, reaches four percent of a one to two million dollar issue;'126 however, this
percentage is substantially reduced in larger issues. 12 7 Furthermore, municipal issuers already prepare some of the same
information that would be required in registration statements
for inclusion in sales literature and for presentation to the rating services. 128 And the increased. costs of registration would
be further offset if interest rates declined as a result of more
129
comprehensive regulation of issuers.
4. Federal Interference
Municipal issuers have also been concerned that federal
regulation of their securities offerings would involve burdensome
federal intrusion into the operation of local government. 30 The
constitutionality of such regulation was questioned in 1933,131
and more recently it has been argued that imposition of federal
disclosure requirements would be a "radical incursion on states'
prerogatives," which the lack of abuses by municipal securities

126. SEC, COST OF FLOTATION OF REGISTERED IssuEs 1971-1972, at 29
(1974).
127. Id.
128. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 136-42 infra; Stabler, Credible
Cities, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 6, at 16, col. 4 (Eastern ed.).
Although municipal underwriters would certainly demand compensation
for the greater apparent risk of liability, it is probable that they will
eventually make such a demand under the present structure as well, once
the underwriter's potentially great liability under rule 10b-5 is generally
recognized. See Doty, supra note 5, at 416.
130. See S. REP. No. 75, supra note 2, at 44-45; cf. ATToNEYs GENERAL OF STATES, THE CONSTITuTIONAL IMMUNiTY OF STATE AND MuNI IPAL SEcURITIEs 20-52 (1939).
131. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1933), reprinted in
Fllenberger & Mahar, supra note 28, Item 18 [hereinafter cited as H.R.
85]. Although the constitutional question is unresolved, it can be assumed that the interstate nature of the municipal securities markets

would bring them within the reach of the commerce clause powers of
Congress.

Cf. Martori & Bliss, Taxation of Municipal Bond Interest-

"Interesting Speculation" and One Step Forward, 44 NomE DAIE LAW.

191, 196-200 (1968)

(discussion of the related problem of the taxing

powers of Congress under the sixteenth amendment).
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issuers should make unnecessary. 13 2 This contention notwithstanding, hundreds of municipal defaults have occurred since
1945,133 and New York City has demonstrated the potential for
abuse by issuers.1 34 Although few bondholders have suffered
losses, payments have occasionally been delayed for years. 35

B. BENEFITS OF ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE
1.

Restoration of Investor Confidence

The present lack of investor trust in municipal securities
poses far-reaching economic dangers. Primarily a consequence
of New York City's financial crisis, this loss of confidence has increased the interest rates that other municipal issuers must pay.
Issuers credit the "ripple effect" of events in New York City with
causing an increase in rates of from one-fourth to one-half of one
percent. 3 6 It has been estimated that state and municipal government units will be forced to pay an additional two to three
billion dollars a year in debt service charges as a result of these
higher rates. 1 37 As the higher interest rates on municipal securities exert pressure on the rates of taxable bonds, the effects of
competition may make nonnunicipal borrowing more expensive
as well. 138
The dominant congressional purpose in enacting the securities acts was to restore the confidence of investors after the
market collapse of 1929.131 President Roosevelt, in proposing
the legislation, noted:
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the
further doctrine "let the seller also beware." It puts the burden
of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus
in securities and thereby bringing back public
to honest dealing
40
confidence.'
Maintaining investor confidence was also an important moti132. S. REP.No. 75, supra note 2, at 44.
133. HEMPEL, supra note 104, at 27.
134. See text accompanying notes 145-47 infra.
135. Jensen, CrisisIs Believed to Cost Other BorrowersBillions, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6, at 48, col. 5.
136. Oregon state officials estimated an increase of one-fourth of one
percent. Id. at 48, col 8. Officials of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, estimated
one-half of one percent. Id. at 1, col. 7.
137. Id. at 48, col. 6 (estimated by E. Renshaw, Professor of Economics and Finance, State University of New York at Albany).
138. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 13, 1975, at 84.
139. Dean Bayless A. Manning, in EcoNoMIc POLIcY AND =a REGuLAioN or

CoRPoRATE SEcuRrrjIs 86 (H. Manne ed. 1969).

140. H.R. 85, supra note 131, at 2.
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vation for subjecting municipal securities professionals to
regulation under the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975:
The Committee is concerned that failure to provide adequate
regulation may result in a loss of investor confidence in municipal securities and, consequently, an adverse effect on the capitalraising ability of municipal government.'-4
Extension of the Securities Act registration and prospectus
requirements to municipal issuers should, in like manner, reduce
investor distrust of municipal securities. With complete and
accurate information, investors and brokers could better judge
the merits of investment opportunities. 142 Moreover, registration would bolster investor confidence by affording the SEC
full use of its powers to supervise the municipal securities
market.
2. The "HousecZeaning" Effect
Disclosure would not merely benefit investors in municipal
securities; it would also serve the general public interest in the
forthright administration of government through its "housecleaning" effect. If questionable business practices and conflicts
of interest are exposed in the corporate registration process, they
1 43
often arouse the criticism of investors and the general public.

Comparable disclosures by municipal issuers should have a
similar effect. Thus disclosure would encourage closer scrutiny
1 44
of state and local government operations by the electorate.
141. S. REP.No. 75, supra note 2, at 3-4.
142. The effect of nondisclosure under the present structure has been
noted by a national public accounting firm:
Several large cities, states and other governmental units appear
to be in serious financial difficulties .... All too often, the
financial statements of governmental units have proven to be
less than adequate for providing basic financial information.
Decision-makers, investors and the public have been misled by
not being alerted to the problems which were developing. When
difficulty occurred, they were confused and frustrated in their
attempts to deal with the emerging financial crisis.
-ARTHUR
ANDERSEN & Co., SouND FNMxCiAL REPORTInG IN THE PuBLIc
SECTOR 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as AnMERSEN].

143. SEC, DisCLOSURE TO INVEsTORs: A REAPPRAisAL OF FEDERAL ADPOLIcIEs UNDER
a '33 AND '34 ACTS-THE WHEAT REPORT

mnISTRATrVE

511 (1969) (summary) [hereinafter cited as THE WHEAT REPORT].
144. In our democratic society, all citizens, groups and organiza-

tions need to speak out on issues which they consider important
to maintain the effectiveness of our political and economic system. If this country is to maintain effective checks and balances
in our political system, public officials must be held accountable
for the financial affairs of the activities in the government for
which they are responsible. To achieve accountability, effective
accounting controls and sound financial reporting are essential.
supra note 142, Preface.

ANDERSEN,
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The circumstances leading to the financial crisis in New York
City illustrate the need for such scrutiny. Audits conducted
after investors and underwriters refused to purchase the city's
short-term notes disclosed massive deficits hidden by "bookkeeping gimmicks.."145

These gimmicks included overstating fed-

eral and state aid receivables, entering the total property tax
levy without allowing for uncollected taxes, and entering sewer
and water charges the year before they were paid.14 6 A report
compiled by New York City Controller Harrison J. Goldin
concluded:
Our present accounting principles and practices produce
three unacceptable results. They enable us to spend without
taxing or otherwise generating recurring revenue; finance the
resulting operating cash deficits with short- and long-term debt,
and obscure
the above facts in undecipherable financial state47
ments.1

The report estimated that the cost of eliminating the resulting
148
deficits over the next 15 years would be over $5.5 billion.
In view of the municipal services that were financed, it is
an open question whether the New York City electorate would
have willingly incurred these costs had disclosure been made.
City officials, however, failed to furnish accurate financial
information, thus depriving the electorate of the opportunity to
make such a decision. Moreover, the obscurity of the financial records relieved these officials from accountability for the
fiscal operation of the city. Registration of municipal securities would require issuers to conform to accounting standards
set by the SEC149 and could close the "serious gaps in the way
in which municipalities maintain their books and account for
their monies."'5 0 Investors and taxpayers alike would benefit
from the more efficient and responsible government that would
result from a registration requirement.' 51
145. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1975, at 1, col. 7.
146. Id. at 16, cols. 7-8.
147. Id. col. 7.
148. Id. col. 4.
149. Section 19 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1970), gives
the SEC the power to set accounting standards to be followed by registrants.
150. Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., ABA Annual
Convention, Aug. 1975, in BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP., Aug. 13, 1975, at
A-1.
151. As a result of our inquiry and our conviction that sound
financial reporting is required to inform both shareholders in the
private sector and the electorate in the public sector of the economic results for their specific groups, we have arrived at the
following conclusions:
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3. Allocation of Resources
The ability of investors to make rational decisions as to the
merits of securities issues significantly affects the national
economy. 152 The securities markets generally serve to allocate
the capital available in the nation among those enterprises that
have a present use for it. Without sufficient information, the
municipal securities market cannot allocate capital efficiently
since the true value of an issue might not be reflected by evaluations based on incomplete or inaccurate information. 15 3 Some
issuers may pay a higher price for the use of investors' money
than other issuers, even though the merits of the issue justify the
same or lower cost. On the other hand, some investors may
receive smaller returns than are appropriate for the risks involved. The principal function of the disclosure requirements
of the Securities Act is to provide pertinent financial information
to investors. 154 Sophisticated investors can use this information to evaluate the potential risks and benefits of a particular
investment and thereby reach an intelligent decision to buy or
not to buy. Less sophisticated investors must rely on the advice
of securities professionals and analysts, but the worth of such
advice is necessarily determined by the accuracy of the information on which it is based. 1 5 Disclosure would not ensure that
the municipal securities markets would operate with complete
efficiency since it would not eliminate the complex factors affecting investor decisions generally. 56 Disclosure could, however,
reduce the effects of these forces by allowing more accurate
evaluations of the merits of particular municipal securities issues.
C.

PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
The Securities Act of 1933 was drafted to regulate issuers
-The United States Government should provide annual consolidated financial statements on an accrual basis including all entities in the Government and all programs which may require future taxes for present liabilities.
-Cities, states and other political subdivisions should be required to publish similar statements annually and in connection
with sales of securities to the public.

ANDERsEN, supra note 142, at 1.
152. THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 1.43, at 60-61.

153. Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities

Markets, in EcoNoMc PoLIcY AND THE REGULATION Or CoRPoRATE SECUR-

mES 185, 190 (H. Manne ed. 1969).

154. H.R. 85, supra note 131, at 8.

155.

Cf. Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAw.

631 (1973).

156.
FoRTN

Cf. Friend & Parker, A New Slant on the Stock Market,
Sept. 1956, at 121.
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of corporate securities. 157 The registration and prospectus
requirements of the Act were thus designed to elicit information
useful in analyzing the finances of a business. An extension of
the Act to cover municipal issuers would therefore require
recognition of the unique structures, functions, and operations of
municipalities. 15 8 Local governmental units in this country
number over 80,000,159 however, and their structures vary
157. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text.
158. The following bill was introduced by Senator Eagleton on October 28, 1975, and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a)
section 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act of 1933 is amended(1) by striking out "or any territory thereof, or by the District of Columbia, or by any State of the United States, or
by any political subdivision of a State or territory or by any
public instrumentality of one or more States or territories,";
and
(2) by striking out "or any security which is an industrial
development bond" and all that follows through the semicolon following "does not apply to such security".
(b) Section 3 of such Act is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new subsection:
"(d) The Commission may from time to time by its rules
and regulations and subject to terms and conditions as may
be prescribed therein add to the securities exempted as provided in this section any class of securities issued by a State
of the United States or by any political subdivision of a
State or by any territory of the United States or political
subdivision of a territory or by any public instrumentality
of one or more States or territories if it finds, having regard
to the purposes of this title, that the enforcement of this
title with respect to such securities is not necessary in the
public interest and for the protection of investors."
(c) Section 15B (d) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 is amended by striking out "Neither the Commission nor
the Board is" and inserting in lieu thereof "The Board is not".
S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
The Eagleton bill fails to recognize the problems unique to municipal
securities. Although the Commission could tailor the 1933 Act's disclosure requirements to municipal securities (Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77g (1970)) and, under section (b) of the bill, grant exemptions to
classes of municipal securities, the bill makes no allowance for basic differences in the accountability of corporate and municipal officials.
Moreover, the bill fails to utilize the MSRB, the regulatory body best
able to determine the informational requirements of municipal investors
and the limitations of municipal issuers. Eliminating the municipal securities exemption in the manner proposed by Senator Eagleton, without
considering the heterogeneous character of municipal securities and the
diverse functions and capabilities of municipal officials, would leave both
the courts and the SEC without congressional guidelines and could result
in unnecessary disclosure expenses for municipal issuers and unwarranted liabilities for municipal officials.
159. U.S. BuR. or TH CENsus, GOvmmNTAL UNrrs n 1967, at 23
(1967).
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widely according to function, history, and geographic location.
For example, some public officials are elected, while others are
appointed or serve ex officio; the titular head of the government
may exercise complete control over its operations or merely perform a ceremonial role.160 Such wide disparities must all be considered in tailoring disclosure requirements to the municipal
securities market.
1. Liability of Elected Officials
A number of policy considerations preclude assigning responsibilities under the Securities Act to municipal officials in the
same manner as they are assigned to corporate officials. Corporate officials are accountable to the owners of the corporation.' 0 '
The potential liability of these officials to investors under the
Securities Act' 62 merely reinforces that accountability. Local
governmental officials, on the other hand, are primarily accountable to the electorate. Stringent securities law liability for
municipal officials could create conflicts of interest contrary to
democratic principles of accountability. For example, decisions
concerning capital expenditures might reflect municipal officials'
appraisal of the risks of personal liability rather than the needs
of their community; in order to reduce those risks, municipal
securities sales literature might over-emphasize the negative
aspects of an issue at the cost of higher interest rates. Moreover, the risk of liability might well. reduce the number of those
willing to seek public office.
Local governmental officials should, therefore, be exempted
from those sections of the Securities Act expressly imposing civil
liabilities for defective disclosures in registration statements and
prospectuses. 163 This exemption would place the primary re160. See C. ADRrAN, STATE AND LocAL GOVERNmENTS (3d ed. 1972).
161.

3

W.

FETHER, CYcLOPEDIA or

THE

LAW or

CoRPoRATioNs

(perm. ed. 1975).
162. See note 163 infra.
163. Section 11 provides:
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when
such part becomes effective, contained an untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is
proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court
of competent jurisdiction, sue(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the

142
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sponsibility for ensuring complete and accurate disclosure on the
municipal underwriter who would be subject to civil liability
under the Act. 0 4 Municipal underwriters currently have this
filing of the part of the registration statement with respect to
which his liability is asserted;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this
section no person, other than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall sustain the burden of proof(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement not purporting to be made on the authority of any expert,
and not purporting to be a copy or extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and not purporting to be made on the authority of a public official document or statement, he had, after
reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were true and that
there was no omission to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading ....
c) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of
subsection (b) of this section, what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
Section 12 provides:
Any person who(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of
this title, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by
the provisions of section 77c of this title, other than paragraph
(2) of subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such
untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall
be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he
no longer owns the security.
Id. § 771.
164. Securities Act § 11(a)(5), 15 U.S.C § 77k(a)(5) (1970).
Although corporate officials usually bear primary responsibility for disclosure, it seems appropriate in the context of municipal securities to impose that responsibility on the party most aware of the informational
needs of investors and most knowledgeable of securities laws. Moreover,
underwriters, engaged in a profitable enterprise, should bear the associ-
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responsibility under the antifraud provisions of the securities
acts,' 1 5 and these more stringent requirements would merely encourage greater diligence in the performance of their duties. 1 6
While elected officials should remain subject to personal liability
in actions brought under the antifraud provisions of the securities acts, plaintiffs in such cases should be required to prove more
67
than mere negligence.
2. Liability of Municipal Issuers
Municipalities, as issuers, should not be exempted from civil
liability under the Securities Act, but should be jointly liable
with the underwriter if municipal officials would have been
liable except for their exemption. Imposing such liability would
give holders of revenue or moral obligation bonds judgments
affording recourse to the general revenues of the issuer rather
than only to the revenues generated by a particular agency or
project. Moreover, evidence that the conduct of municipal officials resulted in municipal liability would encourage closer
scrutiny of governmental operations and increase the accountability of those officials to the electorate.
3.

Scope of Disclosure

Regulation of municipal issuers should serve the purposes
of disclosure with the least possible interference with their operaated risks. The underwriters would, in any event, have recourse to the
due diligence defense. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
165. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
166. Doty, supra note 5, at 416.
167. Liability in implied actions based on a negligence standard
would, as noted by those courts that have adopted a "scienter" standard,
differ little from that imposed under the express liability provisions of
the securities acts. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1298-1309
(2d Cir. 1973) (en banc). To adopt a negligence standard would thus
be to fail to recognize that many municipal officials are unaccustomed to
the intricacies of the securities markets:
The mayor of today's American small town is commonly a
moderately successful small businessman, long active in local
politics and civic affairs and well liked by his neighbors....
Today our large cities seem to be producing an increasingly
large number of capable chief executives. Still, many contemporary mayors are amiable mediocrities, lacking in ability
and imagination and under obligation to a few interest groups
that put them in office.
C. Ammw, STATE Am LocAL GovER iomrs 280 (3d ed. 1972).
Moreover, it appears unlikely that investors would secure much additional protection from the liability of a '"moderately successful" small
businessman. Liability of municipal officials would thus serve a punitive function and should be imposed only where scienter is established.
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tions and at the least possible cost. The heterogeneous nature
of municipal issuers and their securities requires that the disclosure requirements of a registration statement be especially
adapted for municipal securities. Issuers of revenue and moral
obligation bonds should be required to disclose extensive information concerning the ability of funded projects to service the
debt, including reports of all feasibility studies relating to the
projects and information reflecting the experience and capabilities of project administrators. All issuers should disclose prior
debt repayment records, current financial statements, and any
factors that might affect their ability to service their debts.'6 8
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board should be empowered to determine the information requirements of investors in
various types of municipal securities and to set registration
standards that fulfill those requirements without forcing issuers
to provide data of little value to investors. To so tailor disclosure requirements should reduce the effort and expense of compliance."6
Additional savings could be realized by granting
exemptions in cases where forced disclosures would have few
beneficial effects. Thus traditional exemptions for distributions
to institutional' 0 or local investors' 1' who are able to gather
sufficient information on their own should be available to
municipal issuers. An exemption should also be granted to
securities adequately insured by private insurance companies. 1'7 2

Where the cost of complying with registration would

unduly restrict the ability of small issuers to enter the market,
requirements should be reduced or exemptions granted' 7 3
168. Cf. Taylor, Municipal Securities, in FUt=AMNTALS or INVESTBANKING 344, 374-76 (1949).
169. Cf. Carney, Exemptions from Securities Registration for Small
Issuers: Shifting from Full Disclosure-PartI: The Private Offering
Exemption, Rule 14b and an End to Access for Small Issuers, 10 LAND &
WATR L. REV. 507 (1975).
170. Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970); SEC Rule
146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975).
171. Securities Act § 3(a) (11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (1970); SEC
Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1975).
172. At a cost of one to two percent of their value, small issues may
be insured as to principal and interest by private insurance groups. The
insurer fully investigates the issuer to protect its own best interests. Insured issuers are able to obtain a high credit rating from the bond services and pay lower than normal interest rates. Bus. WEEx, Mar. 24,
1975, at 126.
173. This exemption would be comparable to the present Regulation
A exemption, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1975), which, under certain cirMENT

cumstances, exempts corporate issues of not more than $500,000.
230.254.

Id. §
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Issuers' costs could be further reduced by federal subsidization
of registration expenses and elimination of SEC filing fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal securities regulatory scheme as originally
conceived has not provided adequate protection to municipal
securities investors. The entry of less sophisticated'investors into
the municipal securities market and the increasing risk accompanying these securities have increased the need for additional
protective measures. Recognizing the deficiency of after-the-fact
enforcement measures, Congress emacted the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, which were designed to further curtail
fraudulent practices in the municipal securities industry. The
regulatory scheme is still incomplete, however, because it fails
to guarantee municipal securities investors full disclosure of information necessary to formulate rational investment decisions.
Congress should ensure that municipal securities issuers accept
the burden of providing that information. As stated by the SEC:
The financial community, the accounting profession, the bar
and industry generally have come not only to accept but to support the principle that those who make use of the public's money
must supply the information essential to the formulation of
intelligent investment decisions, and that it is a proper responsibility of government to keep
an eye on the accuracy and adequacy of such information. 174

Extension of the registration and prospectus requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933 to municipal securities issuers would
help to restore the confidence of investors in the municipal securities markets and, by promoting responsible government, secure
benefits for noninvestors as well. Not only could this action be
taken without impairing the fund-raising ability of municipal issuers, but it must be taken to prevent further damage to the
municipal securities industry.

174.

THE WHEAT

REPORT,

supra note 143, at 45.

